PDF malware analysis — malicious · 95d3e5390fbe4ef6

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.1 KB

MD5: c5c6dc2d6b1159e3d0064bcc90e0efe7 SHA-1: c3eae3f8ad9ed390324e356eff9b80797ece72f2 SHA-256: 95d3e5390fbe4ef6934264088b9dc792b263478a16c6567bcc8ececc73802c9b

114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a PDF document flagged by multiple heuristics, including a critical ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' and an ML classifier indicating high maliciousness. It contains embedded files and an XFA form, suggesting it's designed to exploit PDF vulnerabilities. The presence of an embedded URL, though seemingly benign, is suspicious in this context. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting a PDF vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x26D8	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x278A	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `9c58a0994eee827abd1bc8adae7b02a4c6236f9577fb5360a2838db447a23842`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x29A3	1789 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x2DB3	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2E5F	77 bytes

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