Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95c2b1bb0746e736…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

35.6 KB First seen: 2023-04-18
MD5: 44620ea83573b9922aff0a407077bb8f SHA-1: cd4e0da01def54b8c4711200fb3097567273282b SHA-256: 95c2b1bb0746e7360315de6fd3d04661b75686bacfb766ea9cb8271cd251dc36
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive suggests the object will be activated automatically upon opening or when the user is prompted to 'Enable editing', a common lure. This points to a likely exploit delivery mechanism, potentially leading to further payload execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000430b.bin
2b1cdec830d80ec3c51af593c240ad99792b2e880b97b811a7649ba93046e62c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x430B 1838 bytes