Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95be57795b850e5a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

293.8 KB
MD5: dde9d7d091ac0cc1d35515d259d8ca6f SHA-1: c6e943143771fc3fd7c2c548f5fddcd6013d9302 SHA-256: 95be57795b850e5aa098c80a107bafdb581da7653d9b57b8f2d37b89880de224
80 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains OLE object data and an \objupdate directive, indicating it's designed to activate embedded objects. The document body provides a lure, instructing the user to 'click Enable editing from the yellow bar above,' a common tactic to bypass macro security. This suggests the document is a dropper intended to execute a malicious payload, likely via macros, although no specific script content was extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00015e59.bin
8de53fa1164f380e756d5b285d6f4c2d05cb8680f8720a4672cc4ca7f5a63b92
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15E59 1405 bytes