Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 959f0eaa15a70adb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2021-01-20 22:43:55 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: b1d025b2b7fe0f7aab49a216f2eaabda SHA-1: eac2b47011ac3c92a418b0ae03cbf8776a628437 SHA-256: 959f0eaa15a70adbdd358ea3ead94af2175478b6eb415a439449fdabd8fd1b09
266 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing or malware delivery attempt. Heuristics indicate it contains a large number of external links, some hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or redirection scheme. Crucially, it employs social engineering tactics like 'ClickFix' and 'Clipboard Command Lure', instructing the user to manually execute commands, likely to download and run a malicious payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/123?utm_term=cookie+clicker+garden+cheats PDF link annotation
    • https://soxiwavarado.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437421/sukag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vexorikodo/Dxhfiio/home_arcade_room_design.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxujurimarawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134640244/66d76aff01b5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://revowerixes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607662/muxeveviwege.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372384/normal_5f8d9d237e886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fixiwuwukufi/bgj5jgG/bombardier_hitachi_merger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zutepojajobemo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454264/7d1ea4cffb424.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nelixifejesuvol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406681/bab67b8a4b7c792.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/noperizapewo/hj5p1tl/bird_of_paradise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pixafosabow/icjgqjR/.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4459625/normal_5fb87b09e251a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/netimawifes/YhdVLhb/screen_recorder_pro_hd_video_recorder.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4385634/normal_5fc979a8efa63.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366987/normal_5fa20cd746e27.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kozamewibigox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874388/1dce2303.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://zalaxorenisev.epizy.com/lego_brand_identity_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wetoxikilosawa.epizy.com/gakufuzowowowobudu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c526.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC526 5172 bytes
SHA-256: f3dbf89792379fc0af14349bec672399df201639f85dcdbe7c05393cf638c0d1
font_01_sfnt_off0000d6b2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6B2 11004 bytes
SHA-256: 1dd74a0e63cd84d16edc0d3139b70db87a77e19d290f7d17573fb561f849f373