Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 957b365f311547d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.6 KB Created: 2021-04-05 09:20:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: c1165344d69cf93da27d3c2515512a50 SHA-1: c9c35081bfdfe3d1daecd0c00cb3acdc4043f53a SHA-256: 957b365f311547d0be16b8c6418f11af5e3c8ea191ba7612a230a3d4f9116341
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of a spearphishing attachment used to drive traffic to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/123?utm_term=physical+education+crossword+basketball+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://dobopekajami.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314215/7969626.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuwikofoxanep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437976/toxefoxit_retis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bugajujifupub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134894919/vemelufuvubej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rubisese.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589844/peganakurelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bazubipevudupu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134876407/pewavefefimaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2a2916a9-e519-4f55-bb9d-ce9e2b5fb6d2/73742740870.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://311919ef-92bb-434b-a93e-382c1a5e2e65.filesusr.com/ugd/c893b4_a30b9e23b7314bdb86434e30e551cfc4.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f621ecf8-e26c-4db3-9bdf-176eeceb312d.filesusr.com/ugd/b3755e_4e68b4bcb04d499ba8fc34b6d43fd1d3.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/452c1c27-67b8-495e-86aa-e8f90c66e56a/what_states_have_real_id_drivers_licenses.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fefcf4f0-bf52-4086-adb3-b788df03f7bd.filesusr.com/ugd/da9d4c_b52fcabb2ab9461b989216949261b32e.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/313295c7-fb4d-43a3-b987-b687f736ed44/zadule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/07a88bd3-181c-46bb-bc24-ae8a2ae65bc0/continuidad_de_los_parques_packet_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://6acbaf94-bc62-4fdb-9a00-914544f0b606.filesusr.com/ugd/3ee118_54ddbac9eaff4a0a8929b747a806ee01.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f9fc249e-2e6a-4908-9eb0-88005465a50d.filesusr.com/ugd/2530ee_68434bbe613346c7a1e79e6fe11beec7.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://21e323bd-7fdd-46e9-a6c7-4880e76d7610.filesusr.com/ugd/0a51c1_1b2692e3ee1c4b67ac74187aaf0d12cf.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/da61b890-c786-4b5c-b55c-64204f0f8816/jazisexiberewedi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://d9e21584-559d-470c-b0e9-829a80f361fa.filesusr.com/ugd/989f82_917dedede574450f91c862422f8483d3.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/93b1dca7-646a-45fe-a836-da456fbc5266/kofuzejalejowasuvaton.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://b1b0174c-961c-4936-87f6-765e1132391e.filesusr.com/ugd/6cf804_2386d9c99bba42939e521ddd18d0e9f9.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21102287-ed8a-4fbc-be13-ec59b45f3c08/is_the_revenant_accurate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fa61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA61 5308 bytes
SHA-256: ed599bc597826e9f4a1128b70804a2985f92cba72040061e1ab8f49362edad4c
font_01_sfnt_off00010c60.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C60 11256 bytes
SHA-256: 1778c60d9eee0ad33e0e5c4dbccc901f600d76419ec28acb85d03ba65d4465b7
font_02_sfnt_off000132a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x132A0 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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