Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95750d3b1152845b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

245.0 KB Created: 2020-11-20 20:56:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: fcc0271db254b2afc07573fa48c93990 SHA-1: 1ba9a68f3acffa70a8ebdf74eed23e1318e80740 SHA-256: 95750d3b1152845b82a552019761c408c4ce49369b1485ab46ef06c038455d7f
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type (jar extension). This suggests the document is designed to drop and execute a malicious payload. The embedded OLE object and the associated native package are the primary indicators of malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload's behavior.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
68dfee15948385768d6bee920598efc263bbd0ab97ef203220547e328f107043		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 236544 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
4f5f315da30891e41dab7a923bcbfe68f111e9dca9f99f1cac4331b626d75f4f		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 232222 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
c53062d127d0b39288b30d97dc2f0fed9cd88fdaf248a7b73650d195d4f924a1		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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