Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95726349388d1087…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.5 KB Created: 2020-11-07 21:04:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 0ac58e07b6d5a75ea0330a1b5625827b SHA-1: c20f5b2f770c034339ad54724d9b6ccc1ef1fced SHA-256: 95726349388d1087cbd967921ab205750c791bf05c94f2fd53df49ef59b7386f
202 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=publix+return+policy+no+receipt In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365662/normal_5f8a872f329aa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367631/normal_5f9b91cb79241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369764/normal_5f8fa1f9a9d82.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368762/normal_5f8973a8c9fac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426422/normal_5fa0df8d62c0b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376125/normal_5f8b751c3a46e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rotafejejulivis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599198/8866875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4457312/normal_5fa6c31877628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368475/normal_5f9b2bb22a314.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366029/normal_5f898581072fb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jifesu/nebiluvef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/toliwudalamem/runescape_auto_typer_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sugaguxagu/aircraft_illustrated_parts_catalog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mexesazaxasa/true_signal_hdtv_antenna_set_up.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D7F 4732 bytes
SHA-256: bc704b9b7c45228a92d36eb0a17bf1b9f131abe9a97f6b58d7c9b4ef26e57ae4
font_01_sfnt_off00006d9a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D9A 1800 bytes
SHA-256: e9a5a1f6ed95b1e3669933bb00002ad32a1708c3e0b735191cad5e02368a6c7d
font_02_sfnt_off00007628.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7628 10772 bytes
SHA-256: febb213b061f6bd64e88495476faeed083d6904a0e1620dfc468e7ac0edd37b3
font_03_sfnt_off00009ac6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9AC6 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378

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