Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 954ad7679ac87217…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.6 KB Created: 2021-09-17 00:25:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: bfe027cb2ade578a17bf86733f7550e4 SHA-1: 41336f4712ddb537d453541788e74132f151a7f4 SHA-256: 954ad7679ac87217dfddc70a51520418d2ce74573f695897714beabdab564c3c
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs that form a link farm, a common technique for phishing or distributing malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest it's designed to lure users to external sites, likely for credential harvesting or further infection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9943

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://lindendirect.com/tempimg/file/56925134112.pdf
    • http://ideatity.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/14525625676.pdf
    • http://www.civilhospitalpalampur.in/img/uploads/files/96029257122.pdf
    • http://simoncaulkin.com/images/xorerob.pdf
    • https://a-pointpro.com/cms/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tutuselurofimenuvebej.pdf
    • http://houtackers.nl/userfiles/file/pivegewagipu.pdf
    • http://drsuthichai.com/userfiles/files/dimazoweg.pdf
    • http://xn--b1adrijbbb.xn--p1ai/upload_picture/77955446191.pdf
    • http://artetendasud.it/userfiles/files/dakipawomixujiw.pdf
    • https://kvartira-zalog.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3350875f2da52d3cc90c3ff2cbbe8bb8/suwunanux.pdf
    • https://etcbt.com/userfiles/file/60997099633.pdf
    • http://interstyle.org/content/xuploadimages/file/limeni.pdf
    • http://bisenzia.it/userfiles/files/67280209380.pdf
    • http://yuha.be/_files/file/kapelosurewunizasuzexamek.pdf
    • http://tribo.kz/userfiles/File/nuruperaja.pdf
    • http://laserbeautymachine.net/d/files/gewolug.pdf
    • https://www.dekleinewerf.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d0ffbd9e3b---kitefugozejaga.pdf
    • http://jmestateplanning.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/50994426476.pdf
    • http://gostium.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161349739a3853---wesumivuwugimedemalepe.pdf
    • https://angelsolutions.ro/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/81521654002.pdf
    • http://pb-book.com/user_file/file/62759895927.pdf
    • http://flightshop.jp/images/blog/file/9376113529.pdf
    • http://kiiga.ru/userfiles/file/16460973624.pdf
    • http://yung-shun.com/userfiles/file/wofavupigugij.pdf
    • https://perfecthospitals.org/FCKeditor/file/lekesom.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=keyboard+shortcut+to+switch+tabs
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c704.bin
336d6fc84833fc2e8eb78c398786fa49ee4d131d20c57cde219615c96aecb75a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC704 17320 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f3d7.bin
1602952de93a41c2c0c3c8361d8e12dfd79f6660ab228905895a1d731042bca6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3D7 10748 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010ccf.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10CCF 16792 bytes