Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 951f510c4408e2ad…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

39.7 KB
MD5: 3978ba3365f4af29d9034d75b57cc228 SHA-1: dce991c46217380924af5b2147c2320d58b62b11 SHA-256: 951f510c4408e2ad6943970b1b3da43bb95929fda99b1edb977a2faf066aaccd
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" sections and the "RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR" heuristic strongly indicate exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. This technique is commonly used to deliver a malicious payload, likely through the execution of embedded code or a linked object.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001633.bin
93d905bb56bfb5cc62580e1286f2628e83062b079b47ea5df71c49c3038929b9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1633 1824 bytes