Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94e7f4d723f824c6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

34.5 KB
MD5: bf02f19177ac17274df1469892c2476d SHA-1: b49d54e6c9bd6a0cf83e6777197b0e830ed9ef33 SHA-256: 94e7f4d723f824c6b356c192fc585617a03357ee368f6cc5496ed3f9ac2f5876
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and object updates. This indicates a likely exploit targeting the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution. The presence of ".bin" in the embedded artifact name suggests it may contain further malicious content or a payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000860.bin
f0401ab2d0aceb267047886b103ae21091f1e644618166afd15292ce8a58e1bf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x860 1857 bytes