PDF malware analysis — malicious · 94e5f914652fdbec

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.4 KB

MD5: 17c6b2f3cfa0b0e7eca5f860a7be9355 SHA-1: c2b90ca71c522c48844a1b65582ad3e0a013c77d SHA-256: 94e5f914652fdbecb48132ac366012210d5a86fdcb45cfa84c580eb4935ff160

114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical ClamAV detection and ML classifier firing strongly indicate malicious intent. The PDF contains embedded files and an XFA form with an action trigger, consistent with exploit delivery. The embedded URL, while not directly malicious in reputation, is part of the exploit chain. The primary attack vector is likely a PDF exploit leading to the execution of a secondary payload, as suggested by the 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' detection.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2ADB	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B8D	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `e4357621b8ed8bbfa5f444ed3283aa0fc49504d729f067aebca709347820f72e`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2DA6	2028 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x3246	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32F2	77 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.