Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94d324cbd50ab65e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

6.1 KB Created: 2015-06-21 08:44:00 First seen: 2017-05-29
MD5: 652ac3ec6c5183cd1ef1b48c1d15c12c SHA-1: d2f04453dea3bc7128ab48509c535df6d67479c1 SHA-256: 94d324cbd50ab65e2170514c49ce0e91c73335d0ec8af978d0ac99c62d8a431e
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable Editing', indicating a social engineering lure to bypass security measures. The exploit targets the URL the embedded link to download a secondary payload, likely a malicious Excel file.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000002cb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2CB 2593 bytes
SHA-256: 5780b2e18100327ae6171f2984432b7d757bd41056190750431c53ed58d9d00f