RTF malware analysis — malicious · 94bae4886fe8942d

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.2 KB

MD5: 57672c47c193f3a557553cab8126f356 SHA-1: 91f23e359413106abd24ecdef8a0a2570cf39090 SHA-256: 94bae4886fe8942d256a84af00ae297e560b1711272c0d7b05d89f98c8067890

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious Code

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) via an OLE object (RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB). The ".objupdate" directive (RTF_OBJUPDATE) forces the OLE object to activate, likely triggering the exploit. The embedded OLE object is a binary blob that is likely a second-stage payload, but its contents are not directly visible in the provided evidence. The attack pattern is consistent with exploiting a known vulnerability to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ebf.bin` `627712c50fd3d91b4db7e49a339a2e6c72b7a1dcfaed0ae73080c7e266b404fc`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEBF	2035 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.