Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94adbb4bb17f69c3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

97.0 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: adc88595be0f6bdcfe3f23eaf91a01e6 SHA-1: 149a44d4c8a81ece9926aa3c68ea5100529fe9f9 SHA-256: 94adbb4bb17f69c385ed2d10c4829d387966f70371576e62cc86b13b1bc7d6c4
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OLE document exhibits a large slack region and appended executable-looking payload bytes, indicating it functions as a container for malicious code. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended data strongly suggests a secondary payload delivery mechanism. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 99,328 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 82,785 bytes (83%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.