Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 949aff507d3d7571

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

52.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-11

MD5: 816354203a51e9e7858ceaa38913a047 SHA-1: 78504aedc43c56020d7a54f58dde412f43954d69 SHA-256: 949aff507d3d75711926d09968c8f54c4cb3292a6a262ee37189ef9c86b2e1fc

142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The OOXML exploit carrier shape and critical CVE-2017-0199 heuristic indicate that this document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in how OLE objects handle URLs. The embedded URL `http://jmcglone.com@192.210.149.222/https_www/https_o/www.doc` is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload. The document is password-encrypted, which is a common tactic to obfuscate malicious content.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE

Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE

OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML

OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://jmcglone.com@192.210.149.222/https_www/https_o/www.doc

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