RTF malware analysis — malicious · 946b9abd38b2787b

MALICIOUS

RTF

52.2 KB First seen: 2025-09-25

MD5: 10d16ed2023764317a227ce0612f6b1b SHA-1: 2f680e4556aee0a38e7a4eb6979a7069f2512ae4 SHA-256: 946b9abd38b2787be6e54b19a51632e1d926a117c643cdeae294da1b88981f89

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates the object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ec9.bin` `3c559dbb949346247a6b1cf7b98e19220f12f049c7159b85a77f25c71e8fcd5c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEC9	1829 bytes

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