Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 946a3c156fabb56e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-09-13 08:20:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 6572ed42aae468823f38fe55590eb864 SHA-1: 56ec52f164c865b0100a369a7c62473e13336746 SHA-256: 946a3c156fabb56e497655650fc592881bb1b4ebda4116d4825a68ab1488b2c1
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised websites or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to direct users to potentially malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution via these links. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, so the primary attack vector appears to be the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://roadtoring.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b0713d7a59cbd0b6e833af154e8d60c2/67571940428.pdf
    • http://fluorescent-training.com/file/benurujozag.pdf
    • http://gsemilia.it/userfiles/files/9441696810.pdf
    • https://marblo.marblobaths.ph/app/webroot/img/files/poruxexexififepadikov.pdf
    • https://www.thic.net/plugin/ce1/ckfinder/userfiles/files/10897520738.pdf
    • https://agape4u.org/userfiles/file/13275139516.pdf
    • http://irths.com/upload_files/files/89259860664.pdf
    • http://jmyhship.com/uploadfile/files/sedolaj.pdf
    • http://odumakus.com/uploads/files/jumiwowowodabutigavudoxo.pdf
    • http://indecomavo.pl/userimg/inc/69388139790.pdf
    • http://soleilboo.com/images/uploads/files/80870446458.pdf
    • https://lenaoyunlar.net/calisma2/files/uploads/83444901736.pdf
    • https://pernambucoimortal.com/imagens/files/doxite.pdf
    • http://annabarons.lv/files/files/maribanotowulofivakutixu.pdf
    • http://ecoaga.com/documentos/file/63163291106.pdf
    • http://bobmeetin.com/media/galleries/files/87367129987.pdf
    • http://photo-ostrov.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sotofarisinoxaluw.pdf
    • http://contactfm.be/userfiles/files/94988345379.pdf
    • http://aeskulap24h.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613552f21bfd6---lomolawe.pdf
    • https://deconkhoemanh.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r40937rfnts33hirqc6v82qbgg/37877585450.pdf
    • http://z500.si/files/lapusosinupujuwu.pdf
    • http://terrietanaka.com/library/files/33862554236.pdf
    • https://actsonics.com/uploads/files/202109020450585574.pdf
    • https://medosojewellery.com/userfiles/files/texin.pdf
    • https://euinsuti.ro/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/62521104071.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+use+an+old+cell+phone+as+a+webcam
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e83f.bin
623e8ae3f4b83cfdb639e795f5304e68376c3061048daca5889b6e9a8e7ed26c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE83F 18108 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001171e.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1171E 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012f35.bin
6e6e31813bdb869a0f370cb1bfa56f60b0a2d91174f0f7054d37a995e00a1e7c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F35 10904 bytes