Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9467b3f8e5af7d46…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-07-20 13:12:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: 135816cb15192aab139b246387e6eadf SHA-1: 7a50709d8d1a1ce8f82926ba8712318dc77f1c3e SHA-256: 9467b3f8e5af7d46fa2131bd8fc0e9bc0747d001cda56e6f3e0fab92cf42b079
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics indicate it functions as a link farm, potentially leading to further malicious content or downloads. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristics suggest social engineering tactics designed to trick the user into enabling content or executing commands, which is a common method for delivering secondary payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://sirmamedia.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/9705211315.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://fandimnarodaku.cz/upload/file/lozinotuluxaka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.visitrwanda.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1a634d6dffb6d64616560117aee7ae24/63422097261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ms01bet.net/contents//files/pamumevopip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mtecommerce.it/public/news/file/vuxedezavazenajazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://publicbridge.pl/userfiles/file/zunerijudimavenafet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.psstrecno.sk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cda9e8bb4e4---2428775151.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://better-pharma.com/images/file/files/lulibuzudesixonezenexazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://actioncoach.com.my/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c551be6607c---kunalutofujewilipelurojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.stockholmswingallstars.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c0a0a0230c6---xilunebozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zhuoer.ltd/userfiles/file/21017839432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.adcgrain.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bdf99095f185538f245686a1c29d1cda/57329775885.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://flemingfamilies.org/clients/8/8a/8af36a28baf44bfc7b8a7004fb4eaede/File/38837449830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gsoam.ge/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c4693fedda4---56357208506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.toptehnik.si/images/lofeja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bilbox.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a82fbab490371caed6d2d7e91d7b7224/89744580422.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://peterdegendt.be/file/kisinowowo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://extreamtuning.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084e35f730cc---gitajawezumobagogegujefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxiserviceh24.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ddb20c7d95---15489614446.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://etcad.net/np/upfile/file/taniposimosojemevakedumi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balustrady-metalik.pl/files/927155928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://masterpieces-mallorca.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/31569fd0397d46876ea5a5472de885ae/nakuxot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=open+pdf+as+pptPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d11b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD11B 17208 bytes
SHA-256: 9edb1d3789dddb77010e2809b5a5ac2b463fb2316f14dacb1b3dc1f50f96518c
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe3c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE3C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011653.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11653 10156 bytes
SHA-256: 9f5bc59bacb92c79105736ba3f411c92faf8325a8e82fc7c69df0fe2640903cf

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