Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 944062aefad4fa4c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.4 KB Created: 2021-06-25 17:37:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: 6a7a5e4ec620aeb1acb8d706b1f1cbc7 SHA-1: e0f678e375011838c0abaf97fb81e7a4f31a23a3 SHA-256: 944062aefad4fa4cd2eb07bd71b08f2e0853cf6e2046dbf2e1774883c7975e73
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external resources, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress uploads and disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. Heuristics indicate a phishing lure, specifically related to invoices or payments, and a callback phishing pretext. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the exploitation of PDF vulnerabilities to execute further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9955

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.lnk-creation.fr/upload/file/7397875194.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://digireg.nz/upload/40890333282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dacoma.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f720fc6b2b---42146640057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seroinstitute.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4f3ea2d915223eeb8fd99c402be8e70d/bazalufoluzozepulidosoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.benvenutialmare.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608aa03238906---96139394832.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albatrossmrn.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/35364024651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sandzthabapanel.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606e5549a06bb---27921485232.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://trenermichal.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cfc31cf3e94---52374070396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.euroservicemilano.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7cc00769d2---87650462125.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://handbook.hu/upload/page/file/51236660908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beckydavidsonhomes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bec8223c407---70520758671.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.191seo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6471d2df80---57738061280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.amiunaorchestra.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090803ba74bb---95151114807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dtcprojects.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/13oknfpk2cpmgmupqk5q6haoht/70402266580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asianmosaicnyc.com/userfiles/file/88061832518.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sparkprototypes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f76fdeb542---1375158995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hsegroup.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3ff4g2bu1hptnq9abefts1vhi4/kelolo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/punipejodusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tuabogadoangel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fd25325fec927f46f030b08146dd1930/diwilivafuselivubolime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://asiaviews.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2h1jorric2n7ku38ft26lnltl3/55920894644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mysmilestudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd62e980afc4356e9a130b67bc3ae6bb/68755041050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tcurryproperties.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/12768251450.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.asejnrtigers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075bf69adb12---36256236651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mn-lawfirm.com/box/userfiles/file/newabokiguvaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=receipt+of+tuition+feePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e5ee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5EE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe05.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE05 10144 bytes
SHA-256: 51f41a2eea37f1fb598a7b72e0a243db41036ad9813339e9d18593e2cace2cdc
font_02_sfnt_off000114d3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x114D3 16756 bytes
SHA-256: 24227d026695a6e470f87abb00f3e9a6882a6581582a5cef6e60fb1b8bd927b9

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