Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 943bed94544c88ea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

136.3 KB Created: 2021-06-14 18:33:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: cb35a3ce96d87590a32d7bb9ea102736 SHA-1: 5c42d7f4af6e8fe04c29ffa098dc418454cc1eba SHA-256: 943bed94544c88eab1fee2a74516bec62a83843dc12f8241af3b26d60c265b4e
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm or phishing lure. The heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' indicates the document may be attempting to trick users into revealing sensitive recovery information. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or credential harvesting.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+i+rotate+a+pdf+document PDF link annotation
    • https://zegabilisim.com/calisma2/files/uploads/sepobukopedoderigakasunuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aptchasers.com/FCKeditor/userfiles/file/60801498877.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luyenthitoeic.info/userfiles/file/peporigadivimo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vegasoft.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607fa8714826a---79124827475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vizzzio.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9df07d244d1ba6ad7825130fda4e411d/83557396305.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vervesimuhub.com/userfiles/file/kaxodebupuxuraz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://timatey.kz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/j178sbn7sjuqikdonf8j219mp7/63820726899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hoondb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609407fa34edc---22533699262.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://josephlillianmorrisfamily.com/clients/59960/File/kanufimojep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.grandeprairie.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab0f807479e---9508796367.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://originalcheck.it/public/img_admin/file/%5C/jowakamurawipobusage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sixteengrams.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3mli1ufopqfnu8qrcev4tn2jut/sofixuzojaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kogan-photo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3f702cd13369936148fede304577d05e/wejukarapawofevibage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drstevealbrecht.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bdf6397b74750af6620b1a5b1b2473a8/77021936666.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anmoul.com/userfiles/file/nelufemenudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vickers-electronics.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c366d83f9270708295d1015f3fa263a7/dobudilanuremit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001dcfd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DCFD 5144 bytes
SHA-256: 53b0b6fa4a44246f97b5c0b20dabcd8e545365a01cb508d5e1557d0dd2512415
font_01_sfnt_off0001ee7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1EE7C 11024 bytes
SHA-256: 3bc46859b1a256d88639458119d3c099b569216794b4e3147efeb9fa7f133515

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