Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9420575c234f048e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

17.2 KB Created: 2022-03-29 04:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-03-31
MD5: 5b67220de21c17a648f141808d4c7acc SHA-1: f130ad2d74f7fd1be72d92e75bfd98070de024f0 SHA-256: 9420575c234f048eb8d7eff242a68e61aef306bb838496ebabd2d7d9bb031119
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The presence of a Document_Open macro indicates that the malicious code will execute automatically when the document is opened. The VBA code uses ShellExecute to run arbitrary commands, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific payload and its ultimate destination are not discernible from the provided script due to obfuscation and truncation.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.MaliciousHeuristic-6290326-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.MaliciousHeuristic-6290326-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3430e845bcdcbc6d4be2adef080c26f91b61ecba5e87b55addcb728d3247baaa		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6844 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
b4e6cc32a8f9431a2335b385524908c75a36f39951d6dceff4ddd727794f0bff		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Macro.MaliciousHeuristic-6290326-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).

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