Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9418c75ff9a37e32…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

391.3 KB Created: 2007-09-18 04:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 11.
MD5: 4fc0482247491f8a613f2585e5dc67ad SHA-1: 7965683b08d9ddc031dba58a1ce751e313afb206 SHA-256: 9418c75ff9a37e323c3a72929e911f08c46918f24aecc0081ce7b4a7121fc535
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics for WinExec, CreateProcess, and ShellExecute API calls, indicating an attempt to execute external code. The presence of XOR-encoded strings and a large slack space anomaly suggests obfuscation and potential payload concealment. The extracted path 'c:\winmsio.exe' is likely the dropped or executed payload, pointing to a downloader or dropper attack pattern.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0xCE) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 7 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xCE: 'CreateProcessA', 'CreateFileA', 'CreateFileA', 'OpenProcess', 'RegOpenKeyExA', 'ShellExecuteA', 'ShellExecuteA'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 400,684 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 384,198 bytes (96%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

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