Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 94160121dcc47a64…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.8 KB First seen: 2019-02-10
MD5: a64d8f2070ca40940c6bf9f2deb29640 SHA-1: 9229a7c04620ff404c3fc112d23e61d6bc330d20 SHA-256: 94160121dcc47a64af29f0e86bf585d30d54a6c41769042947c9e13d9bce5936
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this vulnerability for client-side execution. The file's purpose is to deliver and execute a malicious payload, likely via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3B 1901 bytes
SHA-256: 41c518f8fbd304c6c9b6bc652ca145b0447b72b30ff1cb3b40c5e9aa52af97da