RTF malware analysis — malicious · 940387888527e0ef

MALICIOUS

RTF

90.8 KB First seen: 2023-08-17

MD5: ce556b371242f7d1636bb0d7603b98a0 SHA-1: 641b283d0c914c77ea6b05d75efd562f932a3dc0 SHA-256: 940387888527e0efd604a126935a6174423ce34d15dc1fd7b7c894b78985ad71

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The document body contains text designed to encourage the user to 'Enable editing', a common lure for macro-based attacks. The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics further indicates the exploitation of OLE object functionality to execute malicious code.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002cad.bin` `0685b0cf5408a43f5dc7ae00838e9e5b17dfe7d9cfd10e7ab67ab8b6ca1dd6a4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2CAD	1861 bytes

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