Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93ecb5160fffdd40…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 49bc562e26dfc9dddfaa85255849fd5f SHA-1: e9aa13c41167b23bb66c571d97eb1291f0edff42 SHA-256: 93ecb5160fffdd4027631e7edc0034fefda7e541e646f26efa063ed973a66715
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates an attempt to exploit this component. This technique is commonly used to deliver a second-stage payload, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b5.bin
3d24c31246afdd9400a932f426fc78c0a6502f0351ff55340dff52e010d2603a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB5 1893 bytes