Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93b8dea68600976c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

28.1 KB
MD5: 4ea70ef4626af80a9bc34f4ce98b5b14 SHA-1: 8109de134bf658a5b00a5f9ff3cfa7fbddb13242 SHA-256: 93b8dea68600976c807ec8719d5cfd82cee4431dfcd69574cd3520a6073501b1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive further indicates that the embedded OLE object is intended to be activated, leading to code execution. This strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bea.bin
20f917e922b75f3d80589b0b41485fd76797ea208f24824121f45e4d76749499
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBEA 1527 bytes