Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93b7b31f375aa3bd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.65 MB First seen: 2022-03-17
MD5: 8dd60a0afc01bc7c1a1e3c6d5f844ce1 SHA-1: d0e75d5b44cee0a6d7e40454ea328494649f4766 SHA-256: 93b7b31f375aa3bd37e131c4aacd4a4301ad8596d4c4d264258569fe0680c997
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF file containing OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_RELATED. The presence of ".bin [rtf-objdata-decoded] 860747 bytes" indicates a significant embedded payload. The ".objupdate forces OLE activation" heuristic suggests that the embedded object is designed to be automatically executed upon opening the document. This points to an exploitation attempt using CVE-2017-11882 to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1721KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013d3.bin
8e9db612674a57cce24db02bff7690c68e61582fb77378a840c7198d75597345
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13D3 860747 bytes