Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 937d673d5ef48d6f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

405.8 KB
MD5: 988f140996d9ff304ab3787d2430865b SHA-1: a8cd7c5a78340d99dba4115d097f594b36191d3d SHA-256: 937d673d5ef48d6fb394d636e2885a89927e14eba6314b42d22fb6be2b3100e7
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document utilizes the altChunk mechanism to import an external RTF file. This RTF file contains OLE objects that are automatically updated and activated via the \objupdate directive. Within the RTF, excessive hex data blocks and a PE header indicate the presence of an embedded executable. The primary attack vector appears to be the exploitation of Office's handling of embedded objects to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE
    OOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) RTF contains ~1454KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cyprus.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
ce91c05ca01ad5994a31708f5526b4c786b76832fff8fb1bf5776a55630987c8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 740074 bytes
objdata_01_off00178818.bin
72bd76599c17052cc34443573f8b849d1967d3263c0e0f0118bc6c097634a998
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x178818 584266 bytes