Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93672140bd68e4d1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: ff425013450df20ca088a03c2b0cdfb0 SHA-1: 7ad644d222faa94dfe7bfaf10b2608ba092ef725 SHA-256: 93672140bd68e4d1dccd3343d60b76b6da51b0d708748d8c4c2943df2f6dccac
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability is known to allow for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of ".objupdate" further indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
928e9df54a79b31a2fab93c21478d48c36c1b1a9f1c26d4933f22bafb4ef8606
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27713 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d28f.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D28F 478713 bytes