Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 935ab70c4491c20d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

382.2 KB Created: 2010-03-30 17:26:02 Authoring application: Windows Installer XML (3.0.5419.0)
MD5: f78c641a6a767a373ed4d4377097fe68 SHA-1: f99c0d358dffa674aeb9cd3bb68d17668f1c0750 SHA-256: 935ab70c4491c20d13375153dd538eb38533a014afce4aaf677fc782a1be05de
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE document exhibits characteristics of malicious intent, specifically a large slack space and appended executable payload. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended data strongly suggests the file is designed to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 391,415 bytes but its declared streams total only 41,143 bytes — 350,272 bytes (89%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0
    • http://office.microsoft.com
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0

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