Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 935355ba86dc77ac…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.3 KB First seen: 2022-03-01
MD5: 82149440c5f1eeaccc292e398d458cd6 SHA-1: 85ecf5d12c8859a1dc41bfcfac2fb444fe709551 SHA-256: 935355ba86dc77ac36d721e2bdc4f1b88d8de2e5c4fa9869a4b47e9597f127f4
121 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to code execution. While no specific second-stage payload or URL was directly extracted, the critical heuristic firings strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor for initial execution, a common technique for delivering further malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013d3.bin
9742ba1f76361e571c80cc6e5527e5a7b9948e4cc682dc8e4835c2596a2b789a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13D3 2001 bytes