RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 933cf944912dd0de

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

369.0 KB

MD5: e1a82fe3cf9e58602d5b4f25cd79830b SHA-1: 28bf1f32af2a38499757faec0e6712b93ce92b7a SHA-256: 933cf944912dd0de4c1e3ad74a181c1c266139e0fad634a2ca0b5ab4e087da31

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and an update trigger designed to activate the embedded content. This technique is commonly used to bypass security measures and execute malicious code. No specific document body text or scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation strongly suggests a payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000bac.bin` `3637d4ceaf5bb012cf710ec3dde0c33f6ebb41f5a40b30a1656e33dd67d94ece`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC	76404 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000735b.bin` `e822372e80ab84397e815cb383ec966e07b299e9d7495964d5d80aed1381c85f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B	76377 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002e08c.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2E08C	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off0002f62f.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F62F	12297 bytes

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