Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9331d3ef43cad557…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: fc43bce4c00f35fde54f2e29f1cd3f26 SHA-1: 98525e74d8c58963171eb3994189c2875ab72e7a SHA-256: 9331d3ef43cad55733f656c1b6e406c156673261bca231d1ad5c2b0c3e7fde50
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism targeting a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000086.bin
88ebf701f74a6a8abf36950756a576864925c4f9164cf7350c406a98a2a6876b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x86 2114 bytes