Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 931b86e6d9b77846

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

29.5 KB First seen: 2022-10-17

MD5: 9e4aab85338e70eddaef21dd76fe2de0 SHA-1: e76bea83ed9a04c2f674f31344e5405a621a90e6 SHA-256: 931b86e6d9b77846da3b252117bfdf9b03dc681cbe50a3eeea176b91a793a98e

142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1071 Application Layer Protocol T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

The sample is a password-protected OOXML file that exploits CVE-2017-0199. This exploit is designed to download and execute a remote payload from a specified URL. The embedded URL points to a suspicious IP address and a file, indicating a likely download and execution chain.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE

Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE

OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML

OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://uuUASDbjasduhuasduyuASHUDHUSADHU@192.3.101.144/@uuUASDbjasd@uhuasduyuASHUDHUSADHU@ASreweewretrtDU/wqqqserrfdg@dfgdfretrtr@ewr.doc

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.