Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 93151e7b7ca204fe…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.0 KB Created: 2021-02-10 13:47:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 8014e989b4dc313f1271ce891a2d985f SHA-1: f16d8ad577c076ac2a264bb73a358e508129b9cd SHA-256: 93151e7b7ca204fe9afdfb0e0fa76ddca438ecbed6c69d7f1750569ba3d9f402
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF file identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The primary purpose appears to be directing users to other potentially malicious content, rather than executing code directly within this PDF. The presence of numerous external links points towards a phishing or content distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/wb?keyword=networking%20concepts%20pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://ruwatija.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134846771/xuwivijojefitid-mamozumi-ravepalik-leximamajeji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tobalewaluwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437424/5325485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://danaguvofuboxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/4/135401293/3e6e5896e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://labekefetimobu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739294/xinuvawa_nefijunupitibek_vefakepow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nekazexupogufeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454238/6299116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gadukupuwe/IigLjbB/word_crossy_813_updated.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xoredanixeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814516/27c4f6f562.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zotofoza/pObidIM/rabigotijebajazeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sawapevodef/iagcQhi/subedezerezikajure.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muxavitegujun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637584/neleximilatat_tuwebudajekitur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jedexapotup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472831/wavedabikijov-wuxazidefetij-paxugesiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nezusoxe/zjhgdia/98449882030.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zolewiko/iirjdwy/28930585638.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wabelurotetef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134693048/2876348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/titabofasika/v41iihj/industrial_factory_sounds.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gaduwifawide/Dgi43hi/muvenilagokedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bewosugug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814774/788b6408d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9c7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9C7 4992 bytes
SHA-256: 1caca8737511265f76749c218a21ad7df40150a8efc3cc953cc4712ab0de8a36
font_01_sfnt_off0000eaf6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAF6 10008 bytes
SHA-256: f94eb8a2dcef6de586fe54a7a4ec3933a108c6abeda2832d16d32e25ac71f262
font_02_sfnt_off00010d32.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10D32 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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