Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 930c0b7cc7cc498b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

207.0 KB Created: 2020-12-23 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: d7e18259df907e81d62c04b8fe830ece SHA-1: 21cfb6bf92db72cf71fcb8d2b4308901acd9b574 SHA-256: 930c0b7cc7cc498b952a746fb0cf08313d1d451e7a4cb08134d08f51b8da5c61
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The file exhibits high-severity heuristics indicating the use of Windows Script Host and VBA auto-execution for payload delivery. Although VBA macros could not be extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and ClamAV detection as a downloader strongly suggests the document's purpose is to fetch and execute a secondary malicious payload. The specific URLs identified are the primary indicators of compromise.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (AssertionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ecologi.in/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-seo/vendor_prefixed/guzzlehttp/OAQhv0DsS.php
    • https://www.mokarico.ro/css/fonts/giTNCY40jFFxg.php
    • http://almarhoon.com.sa/form/wp-includes/SimplePie/Decode/HTML/34jDMAJY244tA.php
    • https://negara-store.ir/wp-content/plugins/megamenu-pro/fonts/custom/SPgfsd3vi.php
    • https://tothlali.hu/wp-content/plugins/easy-appointments/vendor/composer/eAsxRsn4yHXq.php
    • http://sfp.ctrld.site/5uj1u1wtM.php
    • http://events.thesnazzygo.com/TsKgEXfL7q.php
    • https://cnkmovil.com/wp-content/plugins/php-compatibility-checker/php52/vendor/egOIa0pQyQl3E.php
    • http://tecnosystem2000.net/js/jquery/plugins/validate/localization/J3i0I0AnNvor.php
    • https://ivfcyprusglobal.com/cRD1rGzt5sb.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

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