Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9306190394351d5c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

40.2 KB First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: ea7f600a7208d79f3bd54c78d23bf593 SHA-1: bf417f272652fe384b15c18e6515c9862be4c6f1 SHA-256: 9306190394351d5c1d0d4085b1621a724009784c295afdd19e3596ac2a5a7269
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and triggers an ".objupdate" command, indicative of an attempt to activate embedded objects. The critical heuristic firing for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR specifically points to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code, which in turn is often used to download and run further malicious stages.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00009680.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9680 1316 bytes
SHA-256: 0cf2a6d726e558b8089f2e4c72ca3c9ae82fe884e873820265215e1106675e84
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess, ShellExecuteW