Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92d9ba1e2c52e374…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.2 KB Created: 2021-09-24 13:10:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 08fff0d94d12f78c5ab4f0611aabf287 SHA-1: 3bf4b817dda6520e6a6f7c26dcd89793b80f905b SHA-256: 92d9ba1e2c52e37432df7fce78e258d78cf5c0e863a79477ba269a4b964b3525
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script that references a URL related to 'Connect powershell o365', indicating a potential attempt to trick the user into executing commands or visiting a malicious site. Several heuristics indicate the PDF is a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9947

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kibbkw.com/uploads/files/37246627089.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://newat.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/774d8d29dc71d7993c79851ad201cf90/dadafufakovetaluxim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ccskin.com/geektic/files/7641536285.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pemaboutiquehotel.com/assets/userfiles/files/17785929331.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pui-vital.ro/msg_media/file/77528641661.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ateneoarbonaida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16133209887d64---resivazafefojexusexomiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://96rangjai.com/userfiles/file/wenafivukisanikeduruno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kiakaha.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l1iv2m5tvv1aqvuh8gah7r1htk/29747414968.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614571dfc5389---kagel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://medeeatour.ro/mm/file/6352076443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://creativitagh.com/pevron/www/img/file/74261700106.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://euro520.net/userfiles/file/16306435741329205178.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://insei.eu/userfiles/files/30372287844.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thecargonepal.com/userfiles/file/kepemudore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bloemenwinkelindex.nl/images/uploads/gakorufebalotezep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://airin.lv/images/userfiles/file/73228464998.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80aer5aza.xn--c1acndkmcarx.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wudefawogibenufivuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lamuccacompany.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/68e54267d344930baec4fe13e56e4e63/13890643513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bestlifepolicy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614508953deb5---40443414473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://etalentlink.com/uploadfile/file///2021091907211378.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://apicn.net/upload/files/24897811448.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grancanariacomercio.com/documentos/file/kekuredawofupalofitinus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--zb0by3yusal20ak5lcidnwigi.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/1632309725.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tjsyjdq.com/v15/Upload/file/202198134357325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ohana1bbq.com/uploads/files/fizerizawuduzomi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=connect+powershell+o365PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001174a.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1174A 1602 bytes
SHA-256: 7b6affa597ad45f70020b5e8b7dc0a5eb1349a234614a0923776eff19a1a6105
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='pstoedit'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Dopumo Moxenawigu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Connect powershell o365. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Connect to o365 teams powershell. Connect to all o365 services powershell. Connect t</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Connect powershell o365. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Connect to o365 teams powershell. Connect to all o365 services powershell. Connect t</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Connect powershell o365</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='pstoedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-02T03:54:13'
  xmp:CreatorTool='pstoedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='4da6b158-5a5b-441f-b52c-538467d2d5d4'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='878f9095-293a-4946-b9b1-369409ca2b23'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000b23e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB23E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ca55.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCA55 10808 bytes
SHA-256: b47a3c5142e095be84b294d10ae3181ba52b2161852571985a7331faeaa9b25c
font_02_sfnt_off0000e353.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE353 17332 bytes
SHA-256: 61edcb48fc534120706202b8f3f7e7f92dc46406d840b436c5a7c1e87787b8f1

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