Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92d4e6f6d0954bd5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.0 KB Created: 2021-02-13 18:32:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 43b3b6deb6248ffcaea1207dd3c71dd2 SHA-1: 6c0ff615978dc1ec12cc69c91b115b6b92edd0d1 SHA-256: 92d4e6f6d0954bd5fde09789c90a57256eb3598e0a9d91f16ce2df4e5b7452a3
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded links that redirect to various domains, some of which are flagged as malicious or part of a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=ap+government+congress+notes In PDF document text
    • http://afracheat2.xyz/rollercoaster_mania_mod_apk_downloadrxlr2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mavezuwunokil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134627141/xevenekuwe_zafekok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jojiluvapesoj.22web.org/blockbuster_dj_mix_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nasporte1.fun/arbitration_and_conciliation_amendment_act_2016atvmc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://registrat.space/xagopivomurotapuvaemvvo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yewes.fun/70587538078hg7a5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://6gusevshop.website/european_union_brand_guidelinesa8whg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nefuwumimo.iblogger.org/transformers_g1_decepticons_names.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://1gusevshop.space/wajezipudoneo92dq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://limevekobo.iblogger.org/setc_bus_simulator_game_for_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://koprovk.xyz/sebedue4ycs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://wuxekijonudi.epizy.com/lopas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wefixewixe.rf.gd/15495101170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vimonaker.epizy.com/kejiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jeromopelurab/zezugibupitejaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e696.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE696 4800 bytes
SHA-256: a2bbbef57754efe1eb45fdcd6f486784cc333fc2df47463155d83eb83da25e14
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6c9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6C9 2276 bytes
SHA-256: 82c2a786049a5742d480349a9e9f76ed209fb8a7f2750f2175097ae619fddf3e
font_02_sfnt_off00010111.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10111 10260 bytes
SHA-256: 7ef8c342d16efed9648ab3cbc1ee7506171ed9bac726a05035c37e466ecc10cc
font_03_sfnt_off00012413.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12413 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f

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