Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92acf0cd818d5b88…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.6 KB Created: 2020-10-11 21:54:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 0c204002a7a882f0df27c0650ab17429 SHA-1: 7039def316d105a069b22e96bbf9ffe9b1094ec2 SHA-256: 92acf0cd818d5b887698b90d261c6f22e2486ff21e383d86dd0cc05adf03f047
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=adams+elementary+school+las+vegas In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036796.mozfiles.com/files/1036796/63592678483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037856.mozfiles.com/files/1037856/zadoboganojonujafalurige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037111.mozfiles.com/files/1037111/vivekisipifiwadem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036815.mozfiles.com/files/1036815/renukiriluliba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wuresepuj.pfid.ca/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775841/08144b3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xejajuwa.communitylearningprojectminnesota.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606255/katosotitebas-padoginaxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tibis.kelliannmorgan.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/2539409.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sgtnatefitness.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775970/4557115.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sanfranarc.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408328/63262571818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.yearofdubois.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969693/vilikusedimej-zatisamovinefa-metiretop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/85f316bf-7adc-4002-9d18-7c806bbcae62/rurizolutovurilupufivuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6ec0853f-8029-4d5c-956b-e6d8615d121a/ledinotopikiwarokojet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c5c2e16e-0aa6-4a68-ba6c-b370e7e8f0c8/domufeliwenulufivajubisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f0db37b4-4d3c-4ed2-8e9b-8b52c1a7263a/rumepezafonunuridupivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/765d6ff9-e900-4d77-bb00-93ae4d36f93b/10109700394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000678b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x678B 5504 bytes
SHA-256: ba5cda6bfa75c1fa89d193f106aa3772b3adf6c8e0a4b3a96148c15806b67c0b
font_01_sfnt_off00007a1e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A1E 10352 bytes
SHA-256: 6d0beb87296ecf38825c7875a8b63e69e0defa33a604608166a6f25b9aec8d04

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