Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 92a2c31c4f1820c4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

114.1 KB Created: 2020-06-07 23:51:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: cc2b4ff40ee47c358e7ea6ae3a9d44dd SHA-1: a63153d77a8ad14392248962f4ad27917882cd8d SHA-256: 92a2c31c4f1820c452b1fcdf97613f915d360dad3bfd3803c2e85f2e711da4d2
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initiating malicious activity upon opening the document. The critical heuristic firing indicates a Shell() call within the VBA, suggesting the macro attempts to execute a payload. No specific external URLs or network indicators were extracted, but the presence of the 'macros.bas' file is a key artifact.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
47704567c10a6b666d4b187147f803a0831e2093ea4006155030bb1861688ed0
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3789 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
a065e03e000fb731ccd86084fbf71a29e5e8d1e649947e0135aa1d32d2497f74
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 11776 bytes