Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9269a36ba8da27b3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.42 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-31
MD5: e63cab15c7d5df9304845cfa274ca616 SHA-1: b6a05734935f01e66a05c50f7ade70b0b6e89ddb SHA-256: 9269a36ba8da27b3a5f274ab10c119be533177e608f344c33d3ca17cede941fa
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object is designed to deliver a secondary PDF payload, which in turn contains a direct link to a payload. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques and combines external actions with its structure.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin
282eb6c643d2677ed3db04e114df92181f0f5fa815314fedf3d5532f00379cc1		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0022BCF0/OLE10NAtiVe 1530 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
5a444d4cb70edd115c9c6ad35b9b2ec4a4265624ab2cbc385f662cf4f7589e0b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1480704 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
ecd3d3854781c490339e065f13927a7612ff1d4eabbaa3ef86bb35a9cb542b23		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1459712 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
751f3ab4f973c2294a11dd107e919eb3d6431e6fd2b12405d3aa9bfedead18f5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1425920 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00023e00.pdf
f234ce05136530fbb4bf6dd3fee62b5608665ec48658b2a8c4141ed47d7ddd62		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x23E00 1337856 bytes

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