Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9266b7e06934a2c3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.25 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a7efdf6b05f75d87da78ebac5d8ec871 SHA-1: 8e15570191d6a989809d77f5759d4196c5675f57 SHA-256: 9266b7e06934a2c37355df644d5fb7cbc94d013059ce03e8beeeb961bb529720
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor, specifically exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the activation of OLE objects, which is triggered by \objupdate. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJEMB heuristics further confirms the embedding of external objects. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload, although no specific script or further payload details were extracted.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00132a09.bin
d85a71be1726f85a47e6ef2829502a86e96c5dd6bc9a317c831862a8a7a9f57a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x132A09 3732 bytes

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